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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
DEAN MARTIN: Good evening. I’m Mike Martin. I am the Dean 
of Fordham Law School. It’s a privilege to welcome all of you this 
evening, both here in the McNally Amphitheater and in our overflow 
facilities through simulcast. This is the Fourteenth Annual A.A. Sommer 
Jr. Lecture and we are privileged this evening to have the current Chair 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Mary Jo White, here 
tonight to discuss “The Importance of Independence.” In a few minutes, 
Ben Indek, partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius will introduce Chair 
White, but first I have the privilege of welcoming all of you to Fordham 
Law School. 
 The Sommer Lecture is co-sponsored by Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius and the Fordham Corporate Law Center. It honors the legacy of 
Al Sommer, former SEC Commissioner and Securities Law practitioner. 
Mr. Sommer was a guiding light on the Commission, an outstanding 
lawyer, and a mentor to many scholars and practitioners of securities 
law. His work creating and supervising an advisory committee on 
corporate disclosure, which resulted in Regulation S-K, earned him a 
reputation as a leading advocate for transparency. At the 2007 Sommer 
Lecture, our speaker SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins remarked that this 
lecture has become a prominent forum in the ongoing dialogue among 
securities regulators, practitioners, and the securities regulated 
community. 
Consistent with that reputation, Chair White will be addressing 
issues at the forefront of the current debates within the securities 
community. Just recently, The Washington Post spotlighted three 
officials who are ushering in a new era of greater accountability on Wall 
Street and we are proud to say each of them has spoken recently here at 
Fordham. First is the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, Preet Bharara, who delivered the law school’s graduation 
address last Spring. The second is the esteemed judge who not only gave 
the Eleventh DeStefano Lecture here, but is also in the audience tonight, 
the Honorable Jed Rakoff. And the third is our speaker tonight, the 
recently appointed SEC Chair, Mary Jo White, who, in her commitment 
to obtaining public accountability, embodies the ideals that we celebrate 
with the Sommer Lecture. It is truly an honor for the law school to have 
hosted these public officials and we are very pleased that Mary Jo White 
can be here with us tonight. 
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The annual Sommer Lecture is the Corporate Law Center’s longest 
running tradition and we are grateful for the generous support of the 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius firm. The Corporate Law Center brings 
scholars, professionals, policymakers, and students together for 
discussion and study of business and financial law. It was designed in 
2001 as a think-tank to explore timely business and finance topics, and 
to showcase groundbreaking scholarship. The Center integrates trends 
and scholarly literature with real world events and topics that bridge the 
gap between academics and practitioners. Our programs and our 
business law faculty address complex questions that affect today’s 
economic, political, and legal issues that impact the global financial 
markets. The Center also serves as a resource for our students, 
connecting them to our distinguished alumni through the Business Law 
Practitioners Series and various mentoring programs. 
 
BEN A. INDEK: On behalf of Morgan Lewis, I welcome you to the 
Fourteenth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. More than thirty years 
ago, Al Sommer started Morgan Lewis’ securities law practice. And as a 
way to honor his role, we created this lecture series in his name. Al was 
a Morgan Lewis partner from 1979 until 1994 when he became counsel 
to our firm. He was an outstanding public servant. Al was an SEC 
Commissioner from 1973 to 1976. He also served as Chairman of the 
Public Oversight Board and as a public member of the AICPA. In 
private practice, Al was a trusted boardroom lawyer, a prolific author, 
and an expert commentator on a wide range of securities law topics. Al 
participated in the first two lectures we held at Fordham Law School. I 
vividly remember him taking the microphone and quizzing the lecturer 
on particular parts of his remarks. Sadly, he passed away in 2002. 
Nevertheless, we are delighted that his family continues its close 
relationship with Morgan Lewis and Fordham. 
Indeed, over the years, several generations of the Sommer family 
have attended this event. We are delighted that they are here this 
evening. In 1973, Al was nominated by President Nixon to become an 
SEC Commissioner. In an interview with The SEC Historical Society 
decades later, Al joked that his diploma was signed by President Nixon 
and Henry Kissinger. That is a good segue into acknowledging and 
thanking the SEC Historical Society and its Executive Director, Carla 
Rosati, for their continued support of this lecture series. 
Although they are separated by exactly four decades at the SEC and 
practiced in different areas, Al was the consummate boardroom lawyer, 
and Chair White is the extraordinary courtroom litigator. Al and Chair 
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White have several things in common. First, like Al, Chair White is also 
committed to public service. As you know from the program guide, 
Chair White has served an invariable alphabet soup of government 
positions. In the battle of the acronyms, it’s Al’s POB, AICPA, and SEC 
versus Chair White’s SDNY, EDNY, and SEC. Sounds like a tie to me. 
Second, in addition to public service, both Al and Chair White 
played leading roles at their law firms. Al with the assistance of many 
other lawyers, several of whom are here this evening began and then 
strengthened and expanded the Morgan Lewis securities and regulatory 
practice. Now, we have more than 100 lawyers in about a dozen cities 
around the world devoted to providing advice regarding securities law to 
financial institutions and public companies. Chair White led the 
litigation department at Debevoise & Plimpton and built that firm’s 
practice into the powerhouse that it is today. 
Finally, Al served the SEC at a critical time in the Commission’s 
history and Chair White does so now. In the 1970’s, Al was dealing with 
important issues like the aberration of fixed commissions, the then new 
national market system, and the delicate balance between regulation and 
competition during the financial crisis. Forty years later, Chair White 
and the SEC are confronting their own significant matters such as the 
increasing globalization of the markets, high speed trading, the 
introduction of new and complex products, and the creation and 
implementation of new rules and regulations as a result of Congressional 
mandates. In any event, I know that Al would have been interested to 
hear Chair White’s lecture this evening. At Morgan Lewis, we are proud 
of Al Sommer’s affiliation with the firm and delighted to sponsor this 
annual lecture in his honor. I am pleased to turn the podium over to our 
speaker tonight, Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, Mary Jo 
White. 
LECTURE: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE 
CHAIR WHITE: Thank you. I am tremendously honored to have 
been asked to give the 14th annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. lecture. The topic 
I have chosen to speak about—”The Importance of Independence”—is 
in tribute to both Al Sommer and the many women and men who have 
served the SEC and investors since 1934. 
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A.A. SOMMER AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SEC 
As many of you know, Al Sommer, one of the finest securities 
lawyers in the nation, served as a Commissioner of the SEC from 1973 
to 1976 and is a storied figure in the agency’s history. He was appointed 
as Commissioner during the Watergate era when the SEC’s own 
independence was challenged as it was facing accusations that it was too 
closely connected to the Nixon White House, including an allegation 
that a complaint in an enforcement action had been changed due to 
influence from the Administration.1 
When Commissioner Sommer, a Democrat, was sworn in a short 
time later, he joined a Commission that understood the need to quickly 
re-establish the reputation of the SEC as the most staunchly independent 
agency in the federal government and make it clear that politics had no 
place in its hallways. And he along with Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., a 
Republican, led the effort to do just that. 
In their spare time, they spearheaded the Commission’s 
groundbreaking rules to “unfix” brokerage commissions and establish a 
national securities market system. 
In 1996, when he was given the William O. Douglas award, the 
SEC’s highest honor, former Commissioner Sommer captured the 
essence of the SEC this way: 
The staff of the Commission has never lacked for courage. They 
have gone to the mat with investment bankers, exchanges, the public 
utility industry, the accounting profession, the legal profession and, for 
that matter, on occasions with the entire world of American industry. In 
every case there were loud howls, efforts to bring political pressure to 
bear; unfailingly the Commission stuck to its guns and fought to 
implement the policies it thought were right. It may rightly be said that 
the SEC has done more to raise the moral level of the marketplace than 
any other institution, public or private, in the United States.2 
That is the wonderful legacy of the SEC and its staff. 
I have always had a very strong affinity for the SEC—because of 
its incredibly important mission and its talented and dedicated staff. But, 
it is also the independence of the SEC that was one of the main reasons I 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See The Bright Image: The SEC, 1961-1973, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION HISTORICAL SOCIETY, www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/tbi/ 
crisis_b.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 2. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Association of SEC 
Alumni (Mar. 8, 1996). 
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agreed to accept the opportunity offered to me by the President to serve 
as its Chairman. 
When I served as the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York from 1993 to 2002, I headed an office that was 
referred to as the “Sovereign District”—and that was not meant as a 
term of endearment. But the Southern District U.S. Attorney’s Office is 
an office older than the Department of Justice, and sovereignty, as well 
as its nickname, have served it very well. As I used to say as U.S. 
Attorney, your conscience is your client and your only mandate is to do 
the right thing in the public’s best interest. 
The SEC does not need a nickname to establish its independence. 
Under the law, the SEC is an independent agency, consisting of five 
Commissioners, no more than three of whom can be from the same 
political party.3 As with other independent agencies, the President 
cannot remove a Commissioner without cause and the agency does not 
report or answer to the White House or any part of the administration. 
This independence and the quality of its people allow the agency the 
freedom to do what it believes is right for investors and our markets, 
without the interference of politics or outside pressures 
MAINTAINING OUR INDEPENDENCE 
Being independent, of course, does not mean that the SEC does not 
listen to the ideas and recommendations that come from beyond our 
building. It also does not mean that we should not welcome the views of 
investor advocates, companies, Members of Congress, or financial 
institutions. 
Indeed, we depend upon hearing and evaluating the ideas and 
recommendations of those who will be impacted by our rules, including 
those required to comply with them. In fact, the laws that govern our 
“notice and comment” rulemaking process direct us to seek out these 
views and, more importantly, consider them.4 And, if we do not do so, 
the courts could potentially strike down the rule and send us back to the 
drawing board. 
More importantly, seeking out and considering public comment by 
all interested and affected parties makes for much better decisions and 
much better rules. 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 4. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
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At the end of the day, however, we make our decisions based on an 
impartial assessment of the law and the facts and what we believe will 
further our mission—and never in response to political pressure, 
lobbying, or even public clamor. All comments and recommendations, 
from whatever the source, are judged on their merits—and their validity 
has no greater weight just because more influential or better connected 
commenters say so, or say so more loudly. 
The professionals at the SEC, like those in a prosecutor’s office, 
know that they are better able to perform that impartial assessment when 
they honor the mission of the agency, respect its independence, and 
check their party affiliations at the door. 
A few years ago, at the request of Senator Charles Schumer, I 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee investigating the firing 
of a number of sitting U.S. Attorneys.5 The circumstances of those 
firings suggested they were not based on the merits, but rather on 
purported failures to be sufficiently responsive to Justice Department 
policies or to politicians seeking to influence decisions.6 United States 
Attorneys, like SEC Commissioners, are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. 
My testimony, which like tonight was about the importance of 
independence,7 echoed the views of those fired United States Attorneys 
whose joint written testimony made the point very well. They said: 
Every United States Attorney knows that he or she is a political 
appointee, but also recognizes the importance of supporting and 
defending the Constitution in a fair and impartial manner that is devoid 
of politics. . . . The prosecution of individual cases must be based on 
justice, fairness, and compassion—not political ideology or partisan 
politics.8 
In my view, SEC Commissioners are no different. 
A couple of months ago, there was a very interesting article in 
the New York Times by Floyd Norris, entitled “Independent Agencies, 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice 
Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 45-47, 99-106 (2007) (statement of Mary Jo White, former 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York). 
 6. See id. at 46. 
 7. See id. at 45-47, 99-106. 
 8. Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of U.S. Attorneys: 
Hearing on H.R. 580 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 48 (2007) (testimony of terminated United 
States Attorneys). 
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Sometimes in Name Only.”9 It caught my eye initially because it 
included a rather large, “only-a-mother-could-love” photo of me over a 
caption that read: “The power of agency leaders, like Mary Jo White, 
Chairwoman of the SEC, has been reduced.”10 Naturally, I read on with 
particular interest. 
Indeed, I read the piece a couple of times to be sure I understood its 
precise meaning. Several points were made, including that independent 
agencies like the SEC had become less independent and less powerful. 
This was because some fifteen years ago, the President had effectively 
ceded the appointment power over all SEC Commissioners, other than 
the Chairman, to majority and minority senior Senators. 
Another observation was that the Chairman was now expected to 
hew to the party line of the appointing President, or risk nudges to resign 
as was said to have happened when a recent Republican Chairman voted 
too often with the Democratic members of the Commission. 
At the risk of being labeled naïve, I would like to think that these 
conclusions are not entirely correct or at least not inevitably so. U.S. 
Attorneys have long been effectively selected by their home state 
Senators and yet their tradition of fierce independence that I have just 
talked about prevails once they take office. 
And, I remember when Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan announced to the press in 1993 that he was recommending 
me and two other New Yorkers as United States Attorneys to President 
Clinton. At the time he was asked whether all three of us were 
Democrats. He responded, “I have no idea.” And, he didn’t. As it turns 
out, two of the three of us were Democrats, and I was, as I am today, an 
Independent. 
Al Sommer himself, in his 1996 remarks, spoke about a similar 
political blindness at the SEC. He said: “[H]ad anyone sat through every 
meeting while I was on the Commission, that person could never have 
told which of the Commissioners were Republicans and which were 
Democrats.”11 
And that is how it should be. In my view, political appointees, 
whether they be United States Attorneys or SEC Commissioners, and no 
matter who has chosen them, become upon appointment, independent 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 2013, at B1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Sommer, Jr., supra note 2. 
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actors, duty-bound to uphold the Constitution, the laws of the United 
States and the mission of the their agency. Politics are to be left at the 
door. That is our sworn duty. 
This does not mean that one’s experience, perspectives and points 
of view should not be drawn upon in assessing policy issues—but 
experience, perspective and point of view are not the same thing as 
politics. 
And, all of us at the SEC must fully appreciate this distinction if we 
are to be true to our tri-partite mission to protect investors, facilitate 
capital formation, and ensure fair and orderly markets. 
Now, even I realize that there are limits on Washington’s ability to 
be politically independent. Commissioner Sommer understood this too. 
Although endorsed by Republican Chairman Garrett to succeed him as 
the next Chairman, Commissioner Sommer, as a Democrat, ultimately 
was “passed over” by a Republican President.12 
I imagine Commissioner Sommer may well have shrugged and 
thought, as I would have, that perhaps that degree of independence was 
a step too far for Washington to bear, even for the head of an 
independent agency. Though, I do note that both I and former Chairman 
Mary Schapiro are independents. So maybe there is hope. 
A TRACK RECORD OF INDEPENDENCE 
Proudly, I can say that this talk about the importance of 
independence is not rhetoric. There are many examples in the history of 
the SEC, where the agency stood its ground and stood tall as the 
independent body that it is. 
2009 
In 2009, when Mary Schapiro became Chairman, she found herself 
heading an agency that some wanted to diminish in one way or another. 
At one point, during the early drafting of what would become the 
Dodd-Frank Act, there was serious consideration within the 
administration of eliminating the SEC’s authority to protect investors of 
mutual funds. The plan under consideration was to ship off the mutual 
fund products to a new agency—one that would not have the in-depth 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See In the Midst of Revolution: The SEC, 1973-1981, SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION HISTORICAL SOCIETY, www.sechistorical.org/museum/ 
galleries/rev/rev02a.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
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knowledge of the workings of the securities markets in which mutual 
funds operate. 
Concerned about undoing the entire blanket of expertise and 
investor protections that the SEC had developed and safeguarded for 
over 75 years, Chairman Schapiro took a stand. Questioning “pretty 
profoundly any model that would try to move investor protection 
functions out of the [SEC],” Chairman Schapiro said publicly that such a 
move could not be done “without really damaging the fabric of the 
entire investor protection regime.”13 
It was described in the media as a “sharp public breach with the 
administration,”14 coming from a Chairman who believed that “the SEC 
must play a key role as an independent watchdog protecting investors in 
any new financial regulation system.”15 
That was independence exercised in defense of a strong SEC and to 
protect investors. 
2000 
About a decade before that, Chairman Arthur Levitt similarly faced 
pressure—this time from Congress and the industry—when he called for 
a rule to make accounting firms more independent from the companies 
they audit. 
The rule came about because Chairman Levitt was disturbed by, 
among other things, the number of cases of financial fraud that the SEC 
was seeing. He was concerned that the major accounting firms were not 
only providing audit services for major clients, but also offering 
consulting services. And, that, he thought, led to a conflict of interest for 
accountants who would worry about upsetting their clients if their audits 
were not clean. 
As he tells it, Congress kept the heat on him with calls, letters, 
Congressional hearings, and ultimately by threatening the funding of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. Martin Crutsinger and Marcy Gordon, SEC Head Objects to Obama Financial 
Watchdog Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 2009. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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agency itself.16 But, he pressed ahead nonetheless and the SEC 
eventually passed a conflict of interest rule.17 
That was independence exercised in support of a stronger financial 
reporting system that could better inform and protect investors. 
1990 
In 1990, Chairman Richard Breeden was rightly hailed for his 
independence from the Treasury Department’s free market economists 
when he strongly supported legislation to require more disclosure by 
broker-dealers about risky financial transactions. He also championed a 
provision in the legislation to give the SEC authority to restrict abusive 
trading practices during periods of market turmoil.18 
That was independence exercised in support of an even stronger 
SEC in order to foster stronger and fairer capital markets. 
1984 
Going back a few years before that, the SEC led by Republican 
Chairman John Shad pursued an insider trading case against a director 
of a company that had been engaged in merger talks. The allegation was 
that the director had passed inside information to his friends. 
The agency was not deterred by the fact that the director happened 
to be, at the time, the current Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed by 
President Reagan.19 
That was independence exercised without fear or favor. 
Years later, Chairman Harvey Pitt would declare in another case 
that: “No one in this country gets a pass…No one gets special 
treatment.”20 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. See Frontline: Bigger than Enron: Congress and the Accounting Wars (PBS 
television broadcast June 20, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/regulation/congress/index.html#3. 
 17. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 240 (2001). 
 18. See David Vise, Crisis Management Dominates SEC Chairman’s Agenda: 
Securities: Richard C. Breeden has had to deal with a 190-point plunge of the Dow 
Jones industrials and an earthquake, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1990. 
 19. See Leslie Maitland Werner, Ex-Defense Deputy Enters A Guilty Plea In Stock 
Trade Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/05/business/ 
ex-defense-deputy-enters-a-guilty-plea-in-stock-trade-case.html. 
 20. SEC Chief Vows Tough Halliburton Probe, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2002, available 
at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-07-15/news/0207150167_1_sec-scrutiny-
overruns-on-construction-jobs-halliburton. 
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That is the SEC at its best and as embodied by Commissioner Al 
Sommer. 
My final example is about him. In an interview he gave to the SEC 
Historical Society in 2001, Commissioner Sommer recounted two 
meetings industry representatives had with him and Chairman Garrett 
during a period of significant recession in which the Commission was 
asked to “help” the industry. Although their “ask” was “sort of obscure” 
he said, they seemed to be requesting that the SEC’s enforcement 
division be asked to “let up” on the industry and do their job more like 
the friendlier banking regulators did.21 Al Sommer’s response, both 
times, was that the best thing we can do to help the industry is to ensure 
“the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.”22 Full stop. And spot on. 
RESPECT FOR OUR INDEPENDENCE FROM THOSE OUTSIDE 
These are just a few of many examples of independence in action at 
the SEC over the years. 
But, the independence of the agency should not only be defended 
by those within. It also should be respected by those outside, including 
the industry, other agencies, Congress and the courts. That 
independence—and the agency’s unique expertise—should be, for 
example, respected by those who seek to effectuate social policy or 
political change through the SEC’s powers of mandatory disclosure. 
Disclosure is indeed a key ingredient in the securities arena. It gives 
investors the information they need about their investments. It provides 
them with information about the operations, management and financial 
condition of the companies they invest in. And, it allows informed 
investors to participate in a free and fair market. 
My former colleague Commissioner Troy Paredes, who delivered 
the Sommer lecture in 2011, put it this way: “[T]he foundational 
cornerstone of the [SEC’s] regulatory regime has remained fixed: It is 
disclosure. For over 75 years, the SEC’s signature mandate has been to 
use disclosure to promote transparency.”23 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. Interview by Richard M. Phillips with A.A. Sommer, Jr., S.E.C. Historical 
Society, at 9-10 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-
histories/sommer110101Transcript.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 10. 
 23. Troy Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Keynote Address at the Twelfth Annual A.A. 
Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law (Oct. 27, 2011), in 
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He made the additional unassailable points that there are also costs 
associated with mandatory disclosure and “too much disclosure can be 
counterproductive.”24 Commissioner Sommer also frequently expressed 
concern about the increasing “quantity and complexity” of disclosure.25 
Their concerns resonate with me. When disclosure gets to be too 
much or strays from its core purposes, it can lead to “information 
overload”—a phenomenon in which ever-increasing amounts of 
disclosure make it difficult for investors to focus on the information that 
is material and most relevant to their decision-making as investors in our 
financial markets. 
To safeguard the benefits of this “signature mandate,” the SEC 
needs to maintain the ability to exercise its own independent judgment 
and expertise when deciding whether and how best to impose new 
disclosure requirements. 
For, it is the SEC that is best able to shape disclosure rules 
consistent with the federal securities laws and its core mission. But from 
time to time, the SEC is directed by Congress or asked by interest 
groups to issue rules requiring disclosure that does not fit within our 
core mission. 
Such a situation arose back in the 1970s, after Congress passed a 
statute requiring all federal agencies to consider environmental values as 
part of their regulatory missions. The SEC sought to implement this 
mandate by crafting a rule requiring certain environmental disclosures. 
The procedural details are not necessary to trace. Suffice it to say that 
this was a complicated, multi-year process that involved a rulemaking 
petition seeking additional environmental disclosures and disclosures 
about companies’ equal employment practices; court challenges; and a 
re-do of the rule.26 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch102711tap.htm. 
 24. Id. 
 25. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Differential Disclosure: To Each His Own, 
Address at the Second Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Accounting Lecture (Mar. 19, 
1974) at 18, in http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/031974sommer.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., Notice of Commission Conclusions and Final Action on the 
Rulemaking Proposals Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), 
Release No. 33-5704, 9 SEC Docket 540 (May 6, 1976); Notice of Commission 
Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals in the Public Proceeding Announced in 
Securities Act Release No. 5569 (Feb. 11, 1975), Release No. 33-5627, 8 S.E.C. Docket 
73 (Oct. 14, 1975); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
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As part of the process, the Commission requested public comment 
about whether further disclosure of environmental matters was 
necessary to comply with the statutory mandate. It also sought comment 
on whether disclosure should be required about other areas, including 
those related to the social policy matters that had been raised by the 
petition. 
Public hearings were held and the Commission received requests 
from investors for disclosure of more than 100 different “social 
matters”—matters that the Commission called a “bewildering array of 
special causes.”27 The topics included advertising practices, charitable 
contributions, political contributions, community activities, the nature of 
operations in South Africa, U.S.–Soviet trade, health hazards in plants, 
and “good things a company has done.”28 
Ultimately, the Commission declined to require disclosure on any 
of the social issues, noting that there was no distinguishing feature that 
would justify treating the equal employment practices petition—which it 
had rejected—any differently than the other 100 social matters. 
The Commission also said that disclosure of such non-material 
information regarding each of the identified matters would render 
disclosure documents wholly unmanageable and increase costs without 
corresponding benefits to investors generally.29 
And it noted that “[a]s a practical matter, it is impossible to provide 
every item of information that might be of interest to some investor in 
making investment and voting decisions.”30 
Interestingly, in its landmark 1977 report, the SEC’s Advisory 
Committee on Disclosure, chaired by Al Sommer, responded to these 
issues. It recommended that “the Commission require disclosure of 
social and environmental information only when the information . . . is 
material.”31 It then went on to endorse the Commission’s conclusions 
                                                                                                                                         
 27. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals in the Public 
Proceeding Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5569 (Feb. 11, 1975), Release 
No. 33-5627, 8 S.E.C. Docket 73 at 20 (Oct. 14, 1975). 
 28. See id. at 20 n.72. 
 29. See id. at 20. 
 30. Id. at 7. 
 31. Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission for the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
95th Cong. D-21 (Nov. 3, 1977), available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1970/197
7_1103_AdvisoryDisclosure.pdf. 
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regarding these issues saying that “there are no broad categories of 
[such] information not now covered by mandatory disclosure 
requirements that should be made the subject of new requirements.”32 
RECENT CALLS FOR DISCLOSURE 
While the environmental statute at issue then generated a lengthy 
rulemaking process, it provided the agency with a good deal of 
flexibility. But, some more recent disclosure directives from Congress 
have been quite prescriptive, essentially leaving no room for the SEC to 
exercise its independent expertise and judgment in deciding whether or 
not to make the specified mandated disclosures. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
provides examples. The Dodd-Frank Act is, of course, a landmark piece 
of legislation that is designed to address the causes of the financial crisis 
and reduce the likelihood it will happen again. And most of the more 
than 90 rulemakings and studies required of the SEC relate to that 
overarching purpose and our core mission. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, authorizes us to establish a 
robust regulatory regime for derivatives, which just years earlier 
Congress forbid us from regulating. And, it directs us to write rules 
requiring private fund managers and municipal advisors to register with 
the SEC. These are measures directly aimed at making our financial 
system and the protections for investors stronger. 
But other mandates, which invoke the Commission’s mandatory 
disclosure powers, seem more directed at exerting societal pressure on 
companies to change behavior, rather than to disclose financial 
information that primarily informs investment decisions. 
That is not to say that the goals of such mandates are not laudable. 
Indeed, most are. Seeking to improve safety in mines for workers or to 
end horrible human rights atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo are compelling objectives, which, as a citizen, I wholeheartedly 
share. 
But, as the Chair of the SEC, I must question, as a policy matter, 
using the federal securities laws and the SEC’s powers of mandatory 
disclosure to accomplish these goals. 
That said, as a lawyer and a former prosecutor, I recognize that 
when Congress and the President enact a statute mandating such a rule, 
neither I nor the Commission has the right to just say “no.” We cannot 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. 
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say that a law does not comport with our mission as we see it, and 
ignore a Congressional mandate. We cannot put it in a drawer or tuck it 
away. That would be impermissible nullification of the law and 
independence run amok. 
Instead, in such cases, we can, unless no leeway is given, write the 
rule in a way that best comports with our view of our mission and tries 
to mitigate the costs, so long as we faithfully carry out Congress’ 
mandate. 
To be sure, we can and should proactively urge that, as an 
independent and expert agency, we be accorded the freedom and respect 
by Congress to fully exercise our disclosure authority to further the 
mission that is so vital to the capital markets and investors. 
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT 
I should not conclude this talk about the importance of 
independence without mentioning our third branch of government—the 
judiciary. 
When I urge the courts to defer to the SEC’s independence and 
expertise, I am really only making the point that separation of powers 
requires each of us to respect and stay in our respective lanes. 
There is a fair amount of law on this. As stated in cases like 
Chevron,33 the courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a law if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular point. And in reviewing 
agency rulemaking, the courts should defer to the agency’s reasoned 
judgments, particularly as to matters within the agency’s expertise. We, 
of course, may not always agree with the courts on where the yellow 
lines are, but it is something we confront because these issues come up 
more frequently than I would like in our rulemaking. 
They also occasionally come up in the review of our enforcement 
settlements. While I will not speak of any specific cases, or ill of any of 
my judicial friends, I will say a word about our new protocol requiring, 
in certain cases, admissions from defendants if a settlement is to be 
reached. 
This is an issue that I have considered since my days as U.S. 
Attorney, when I was the first prosecutor to pursue a deferred 
prosecution agreement with a corporation. At the time, there was no 
template or guidance, but I did decide, in the exercise of my charging 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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discretion, to require admissions in the particular circumstance of that 
case. 
When I came to the SEC, I made a similar judgment. I decided that 
in some cases involving particularly egregious conduct or widespread 
harm to investors, for example, that a heightened level of public 
accountability, in the form of admissions, may be called for if we are to 
send a sufficiently strong message of deterrence. 
I realize that many other federal agencies and regulators continue to 
pursue a uniform no-admit approach. And, I defer to their independent 
judgment. Indeed, as I have said, the SEC’s longstanding, no-admit-no-
deny paradigm continues to be of enormous value because it provides 
swift remedies for misconduct and quick relief to investors without the 
risk of litigation. We, too, will continue to use this powerful tool. 
These are discretionary enforcement and charging judgments. And, 
the SEC needs to use its independent discretion—its experience and its 
know-how—to decide whether an added degree of accountability should 
lead us to decide to require them in certain cases. It is our responsibility 
to make these decisions in the public’s best interest. And we will. 
We recognize that, under the law, a court can review a settlement. 
But a court that reviews a settlement that a law enforcement agency like 
ours enters with a defendant has a more limited task. It is unlike a 
court’s wide-ranging inquiry into the merits of a class-action settlement, 
for example. A court reviewing a consent judgment in one of our cases 
has a narrower focus—making sure that the settlement is not ambiguous 
and that it does not affirmatively harm third parties or impose an undue 
burden on the court’s own resources.34 But, the core decision as to 
whether to seek admissions is a decision for the Commission to make in 
its best, independent judgment of what should be required. 
CONCLUSION 
At the SEC, the staff and Commission have a long and proud 
history of standing up to outside pressures of all kinds that have 
challenged our independence. The Chairs who have come before me 
have held firmly to this independence, and so have the thousands of 
members of the SEC staff who worked with them. To my mind, the SEC 
achieves the best results and best fulfills its mission, when it uses its 
expertise, acts independently, and defends that independence against all 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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comers. It is a simple principle. And, as long as I am Chair, I will be 
guided by it. 
 
